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Martin Müller, Zürich
From sacred cow to cash cow: The shifting political ecologies of protected 
areas in Russia
Abstract: How have political and economic processes in Russia impacted protected areas? When 
first conceived in 1916, protected areas in Russia were considered as sancta of nature. In post-Soviet 
times, however, the fortunes of protected areas have undergone swift change: from a period of liber-
alisation and a conservation bonanza in the 1990s to increasing exploitation in the 2000s and com-
modification in the 2010s. Against the historical background of the Soviet period, this contribution 
traces reserves’ trajectory from sacred cows to cash cows. It concludes that the neoliberal impetus of 
introducing market principles into conservation is in danger of going off course in Russia: instead of 
making the market work for conservation, it makes conservation work for the market.
Keywords: protected areas, conservation, political ecology, neoliberalism, commodification, Russia
Introduction
If there is a current trend in nature conservation, 
it is that of neoliberal conservation. The spread 
of market principles – the hallmark of neoliber-
alism – has begun to encompass what was once 
considered one of the last sanctuaries: nature and 
its protection. Conservation economics has be-
come a reputable discipline whose expertise is 
much sought-after (Mayer/Job 2014). A recent 
memorandum of German scientists – econo-
mists and ecologists alike – declares that “nature 
is a capital that is worth protecting. Its wealth 
is, however, difficult to maintain against the 
power of a globalised market. There is a greater 
chance of success if the market itself is used as 
an instrument in protecting nature” (HaMpicke/
Wätzold 2009). Rather than work against the 
juggernaut of the market, let us work with it, this 
memorandum suggests. In other words, protect-
ing nature might be more successful if it rests on 
a sound economic rationale.
Approaches to linking conservation with market 
principles and attaching a value to it have mush-
roomed in the recent past (cf. arsel/büscHer 
2012; becken/Job 2014). Under the banner of 
‘use it or lose it’, payments for ecosystem ser-
vices, biodiversity derivatives and species bank-
ing have joined initiatives to create markets for 
endangered species. Controversial recent pro-
posals have included a suggestion to save the 
whales through introducing hunting quotas and 
then selling them to the highest bidder – whether 
conservationist or whale hunter (costello et al. 
2012). The TEEB initiative, short for The Eco-
nomics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity, is an in-
ternational attempt to establish a standard basis 
for natural capital accounting and thus capture 
and quantify the value of nature and its conser-
vation. Other studies have sought to measure the 
economic impact of protected areas (e. g. Mayer 
2014; Mayer et al. 2010).
The argument in favour of applying market 
principles to conservation is patent: Internalis-
ing externalities guarantees a monetary valua-
tion of the benefits of protecting nature and an 
accounting of the costs of inflicting damage on 
it. For protected areas, a study found that annual 
investments of 45 bn US $ would yield annual 
benefits in the range of 4 400 bn US $ to 5 200 
bn US $ – a “strikingly good bargain” (balM-
ford et al. 2002, 952). Showing that protected 
areas are bargains and not drags on economic 
development is also important when it comes 
to locals’ attitudes towards them. That pro-
tected  areas make good economic sense could 
help convince the frequent sceptics to turn out 
in greater support of them (stoll-kleeMann/
Job 2008). Critics point out, however, that the 
protection of nature should be justified on the 
basis of ethical rather than economic consider-
ations. For what happens if a species or habitat 
turn out to be of less value than the proposed 
human use?
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Questions of the economic valuation and benefit 
of protected areas have a dual relevance for Rus-
sia. For one thing, Russia has one of the largest 
networks of protected areas worldwide. About 
two million square kilometres – five times the 
size of Germany – fall under some form of ter-
ritorial protection. This is equivalent to about 
12 % of the Russian terrestrial area. About one-
fifth of this area is under strict protection (IUCN 
categories Ia/b and II) (cf. Tab. 2). Russian pro-
tected areas, however, have struggled to attract 
viable financing and be recognised as more than 
mere obstacles to economic development. For 
another, recent policies have elevated the ex-
ploitation of the economic potential of reserves, 
often through tourism. While earlier protected 
areas were regarded as conserving nature for its 
own sake, administrations have more and more 
come under pressure to demonstrate the eco-
nomic viability of their operations (Müller et 
al. 2011). In a twist of the neoliberal conserva-
tion logic, reserves have moved from being sa-
cred cows to becoming potential cash cows. The 
commodification of nature and its protection has 
thus also arrived in Russia, albeit in a peculiar 
interpretation.
Against this background, this contribution ex-
plores how changing political and economic 
regimes have impacted Russian protected  areas. 
In picking this focus, it thus continues in the 
tradition of political ecology, which blaikie/
brookfield (1987, 17) once described as a 
combination of “the concerns of ecology and 
a broadly defined political economy” (cf. also 
blaikie 1999; krings 2008). Examining the 
Russian system of protected areas as a whole, it 
complements those studies that have examined 
the political ecology of protected areas in other 
post-Soviet countries (e. g. scHMidt 2013), of-
ten with detailed case studies focusing on single 
sites (e. g. scHMidt/doerre 2011).
The article traces the historical development of 
the protected areas network from its beginnings 
in the early Soviet period, but places particular 
emphasis on the incisive changes since the late 
1980s and then the 2000s as the period which 
has seen increasing stress on the economic valu-
ation and valorisation of nature protection. This 
has gone lockstep with the transformation of the 
Russian political economy. After a period of state 
weakness and economic distress in the 1990s, 
which led to the emergence of diverse econo-
mies and alternative forms of social organisation 
beyond the state (sMitH/stenning 2006), the 
reassertion of state power under president Pu-
tin from the 2000s onwards refocused attention 
on central-state-led development and economic 
growth through resource exploitation (robinson 
2013). Environmental concerns were relegated 
to the sidelines of Russian politics (Mol 2009). 
The new political-ecological regime that has 
been emerging over the past years holds both op-
portunities and threats for the Russian reserves. 
It can bolster the income to fund operations for 
some reserves, while threatening to compromise 
conservation in favour of development. What 
makes it interesting from a geographical point 
of view is its uneven spatial impact, which is set 
to lead to rising territorial differentiation among 
protected areas.
From sacred commandment to econo-
mic exploitation: protected areas in the 
Soviet period
As the largest landmass of any country – almost 
one-eighth of the planet’s total – the territory of 
Russia covers a plethora of biomes and habitats. 
22 % of the world’s forests are in Russia, with 
more than 30 % being primeval forests (FAO 
2005). Lake Baikal alone contains more than 
one-fifth of the world’s fresh water sources. Rare 
and endangered mammals such as the Siberian 
tiger (Panthera tigris altaica), the Amur leopard 
(Panthera pardus orientalis), the snow leopard 
(Uncia uncia) and the Saiga antelope (Saiga 
tatarica) are encountered on Russian territory. 
This natural richness presents both a great op-
portunity but also a great responsibility for pro-
tection.
The first impulse for the designation of protec-
tion zones in Russia, however, was economic. 
Hunting and trapping of sable (Martes zibellina) 
was unbridled in late Tsarist Russia and had 
reached epidemic proportions. Nicknamed the 
‘soft gold of Russia’, the fur of the sable drew 
hunters to the remotest regions of Siberia and 
the Russian Far East. The first Nature Reserve 
Barguzinskij Zapovednik (No. 1 in Fig. 1) on 
Lake Baikal was established in 1916 to protect 
the  sable from extinction and allow a recovery of 
the population for further, more sustainable har-
vesting. The term for a strict nature reserve ac-
cording to IUCN (International Union for Con-
servation of Nature) category Ia/b – zapovednik 
– is derived from the Russian word for the bibli-
cal commandments: заповедь. The connotations 
flowing from this choice of wording are not 
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Fig. 1: Protected areas in Russia
Source: 
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Tab. 1: Protected Areas in Russia  (Protected areas in italics are also UNESCO biosphere reserves)
Zapovedniki (Nature Reserves, IUCN Category I)
Name Estab-
lished
Area 
(1000 ha)
Administrative 
  Unit
1 Barguzinskij 1916 374.3 Respublika Burja-
tija
2 Astrachanskij 1919 67.9 Astrachanskaja
3 Il’menskij 1920 34.1 Čeljabinskaja
4 Voronežskij 1923 31.1 Voronežskaja, 
 Lipeckaja
5 Kavkazskij 1924 280.3 Krasnodarskij 
kraj, Adygeja, 
Karačaevo-
Čerkessija
6 Galič’ja gora 1925 0.2 Lipeckaja
7 Kedrovaja Pad’ 1925 17.9 Primorskij Kraj
8 Stolby 1925 47.2 Krasnojarskij Kraj
9 Žigulëvskij 1927 23.2 Samarskaja
10 Baškirskij 1930 49.6 Respublika 
Baškortostan
11 Laplandskij 1930 178.4 Murmanskaja
12 Pečoro-Ilyčskij 1930 721.3 Respublika Komi
13 Central’no-Lesnoj 1930 24.4 Tverskaja
14 Kivač 1931 10.9 Respublika Kare-
lija
15 Altajskij 1932 881.2 Respublika Altaj
16 Kandalakšskij 1932 70.5 Murmanskaja
17 Kronockij 1934 1142.1 Kamčatskij Kraj
18 Ussurijskij 1934 40.4 Primorskij Kraj
19 Okskij 1935 55.7 Rjazanskaja
20 Sichotė-Alinskij 1935 401.4 Primorskij Kraj
21 Chopërskij 1935 16.2 Voronežskaja
22 Central’no-
Černozëmnyj
1935 5.3 Kurskaja
23 Mordovskij 1936 32.1 Respublika Mor-
dovija
24 Teberdinskij 1936 85.1 Karačaevo-
Čerkessija
25 Lazovskij 1940 121.0 Primorskij Kraj
26 Darvinskij 1945 112.7 Vologodskaja, 
 Jaroslavskaja
27 Prioksko-Terras-
nyj
1945 4.9 Moskovskaja
28 Volžsko-Kamskij 1960 10.1 Respublika Tatar-
stan
29 Bol’šechech-
cirskij
1963 45.4 Chabarovskij Kraj
30 Komsomol’skij 1963 64.4 Chabarovskij Kraj
31 Zejskij 1963 99.4 Amurskaja
32 Chinganskij 1963 97.1 Amurskaja
33 Vostočno-
Ural’skij
1966 16.6 Čeljabinskaja
34 Severo-Osetinskij 1967 29.5 Respublika Sever-
naja Osetija
35 Bajkal’skij 1969 165.7 Respublika Burja-
tija
36 Visimskij 1971 33.5 Sverdlovskaja
37 Sochondinskij 1973 211.0 Čitinskaja
38 Pinežskij 1974 51.5 Archangelskaja
39 Kabardino-Bal-
karskij Vysoko-
gornyj
1976 82.6 Kabardino-Bal-
karskaja Respub-
lika
40 Malaja Sos’va 1976 225.6 Chanty-Mansijs-
kij AO
41 Ostrov Vrangelja 1976 2225.7 Čukotskij AO
42 Sajano-Šušenskij 1976 390.4 Krasnojarskij Kraj
43 Dal’nevostočnyj 
Morskoj
1978 64.3 Primorskij Kraj
44 Južno-Ural’skij 1978 252.8 Baškortostan, 
Čeljabinskaja
45 Belogor’e 1979 2.1 Belgorodskaja
46 Tajmyrskij 1979 1781.9 Krasnojarskij Kraj
47 Nižne-Svirskij 1980 41.6 Leningradskaja
48 Basegi 1982 38.0 Permskaja
49 Magadanskij 1982 883.8 Magadanskaja
50 Vitimskij 1982 585.0 Irkutskaja
51 Juganskij 1982 648.6 Chanty-Mansijs-
kij AO
52 Kostomukšskij 1983 47.6 Respublika Kare-
lija
53 Kuril’skij 1984 65.4 Sachalinskaja
54 Olëkminskij 1984 847.1 Respublika Sacha 
(Jakutija)
55 Azas 1985 300.4 Respublika Tyva
56 Ust’-Lenskij 1985 1433.0 Respublika Sacha 
(Jakutija)
57 Central’ 
nosibirskij
1985 1018.8 Krasnojarskij Kraj
58 Bajkalo-Lenskij 1986 659.9 Irkutskaja
59 Verchne-Tazovs-
kij
1986 631.3 Jamalo-Neneckij 
AO
60 Šul’gan-Taš 1986 22.5 Respublika 
Baškortostan
61 Brjanskij les 1987 12.2 Brjanskaja
62 Bureinskij 1987 358.4 Chabarovskij Kraj
63 Dagestanskij 1987 19.1 Respublika Dage-
stan
64 Daurskij 1987 45.8 Čitinskaja
65 Poronajskij 1988 56.7 Sachalinskaja
66 Putoranskij 1988 1887.3 Krasnojarskij Kraj
67 Kuzneckij Alatau 1989 412.9 Kemerovskaja
68 Orenburgskij 1989 21.7 Orenburgskaja
69 Privolžskaja 
 Lesostep’
1989 8.3 Penzenskaja
70 Džugdžurskij 1990 860.0 Chabarovskij Kraj
71 Chankajskij 1990 39.3 Primorskij Kraj
72 Černye Zemli 1990 121.9 Respublika Kal-
mykija
73 Denežkin Kamen’ 1991 78.2 Sverdlovskaja
74 Katunskij 1991 151.6 Respublika Altaj
75 Višerskij 1991 241.2 Permskaja
76 Džerginskij 1992 238.1 Respublika Burja-
tija
77 Kalužskie Zaseki 1992 18.5 Kalužskaja
78 Pasvik 1992 14.7 Murmanskaja
79 Bol’šaja Kokšaga 1993 21.6 Respublika Marij 
Ėl
80 Bol’šoj 
Arktičeskij
1993 4169.2 Krasnojarskij Kraj
81 Kerženskij 1993 46.8 Nižegorodskaja
82 Komandorskij 1993 3648.7 Kamčatskij Kraj
83 Ubsunurskaja 
Kotlovina
1993 323.2 Respublika Tyva
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84 Voroninskij 1994 10.3 Tambovskaja
85 Botčinskij 1994 267.4 Chabarovskij Kraj
86 Nurguš 1994 5.9 Kirovskaja
87 Polistovskij 1994 38.0 Pskovskaja
88 Rdejskij 1994 36.9 Novgorodskaja
89 Korjakskij 1995 327.2 Kamčatskij Kraj
90 Prisurskij 1995 9.1 Čuvašskaja Res-
publika
91 Rostovskij 1995 9.5 Rostovskaja
92 Tungusskij 1995 296.6 Krasnojarskij Kraj
93 Gydanskij 1996 878.2 Jamalo-Neneckij 
AO
94 Bastak 1997 91.8 Evrejskaja AO
95 Bolon’skij 1997 103.6 Chabarovskij Kraj
96 Bogdinsko-
Baskunčakskij
1997 18.5 Astrachanskaja
97 Neneckij 1997 313.4 Jamalo-Neneckij 
AO
98 Norskij 1998 211.2 Amurskaja
99 Chakasskij 1999 267.6 Respublika Cha-
kasija
100 Tigirekskij 1999 40.7 Altajskij Kraj
101 Ėrzi 2000 6.0 Respublika 
Ingušetija
102 Kologrivskij Les 2006 58.9 Kostromskaja
103 Utriš 2010 10.0 Krasnodarskij 
Kraj
National Parks (IUCN Category II)
Name Estab-
lished
Area 
(1000 ha)
Administrative 
  Unit
1 Losinyj Ostrov 1983 12.9 Moscow, Mos-
kovskaja
2 Sočinskij 1983 193.7 Krasnodarskij 
Kraj
3 Samarskaja Luka 1984 127.2 Samarskaja
4 Marij Čodra 1985 36.6 Respublika Marij 
Ėl
5 Baškirija 1986 82.3 Respublika 
Baškortostan
6 Zabajkal’skij 1986 267.2 Respublika Burja-
tija
7 Pribajkal’skij 1986 418.0 Irkutskaja
8 Priėl’brus’e 1986 101.2 Kabardino-Bal-
karskaja Respub-
lika.
9 Kuršskaja Kosa 1987 6.6 Kaliningradskaja
10 Pleščeevo Ozero 1988 23.6 Jaroslavskaja
11 Šorskij 1989 413.8 Kemerovskaja
12 Valdajskij 1990 158.5 Novgorodskaja
13 Vodlozerskij 1991 468.9 Karelija, 
Archangel’skaja
14 Kenozerskij 1991 139.7 Archangel’skaja
15 Nižnjaja Kama 1991 26.6 Respublika Tatar-
stan
16 Taganaj 1991 56.8 Čeljabinskaja
17 Tunkinskij 1991 1183.7 Respublika Burja-
tija
18 Meščera 1992 118.9 Vladimirskaja
19 Meščerskij 1992 103.0 Rjazanskaja
20 Paanajarvi 1992 104.5 Respublika Kare-
lija
21 Russkij Sever 1992 166.4 Vologodskaja
22 Smolenskoe 
Poozer’e
1992 146.2 Smolenskaja
23 Zjuratkul’ 1993 88.2 Čeljabinskaja
24 Pripyšminskie 
Bory
1993 48.7 Sverdlovskaja
25 Čavaš Varmane 1993 25.2 Čuvašskaja Res-
publika
26 Orlovskoe 
Poles’e
1994 77.7 Orlovskaja
27 Chvalynskij 1994 25.5 Saratovskaja
28 Jugyd va 1994 1891.7 Respublika Komi
29 Smol’nyj 1995 36.4 Respublika Mor-
dovija
30 Šušenskij Bor 1995 39.2 Krasnojarskij Kraj
31 Sebežskij 1996 50.0 Pskovskaja
32 Nečkinskij 1997 20.8 Udmurtskaja Res-
publika
33 Ugra 1997 98.6 Kalužskaja
34 Alanija 1998 54.9 Severnaja Osetija 
35 Alchanaj 1999 138.2 Čitinskaja
36 Kaleval’skij 2006 74.4 Respublika Kare-
lija
37 Zov Tigra 2007 82.2 Primorskij Kraj
38 Udėgejskaja 
 Legenda
2007 88.6 Charabovskij Kraj
39 Anjujskij 2007 429.7 Charabovskij Kraj
40 Buzulukskij Bor 2008 106.8 Orenburgskaja/
Samarskaja
41 Russkaja Arktika 2009 1426.0 Archangel’skaja
42 Sajljugemskij 2010 118.3 Respublika Altaj
43 Zemlja Leoparda 2012 261.9 Primorskij Kraj
44 Beringija 2013 1819.4 Čukotskij AO
45 Onežskoe 
Pomor’e
2013 201.6 Archangel’skaja
UNESCO Natural World Heritage Sites
Name Included Administrative 
Unit
1 Virgin Komi 
 Forests
1995 Respublika Komi
2 Lake Baikal 1996 Irkutskaja, Res-
publika Burjatija
3 Volcanoes of 
Kamchatka
1996 Kamčatskaja
4 Golden Moun-
tains of Altaj
1998 Respublika Altaj
5 Western 
 Caucasus
1999 Krasnodarskij 
Kraj
6 Central  
Sikhote-Alin
2001 Primorskij Kraj
7 Uvs Nuur Basin 2003 Respublika Tyva 
(and Mongolia)
8 Wrangel Island 2004 Čukotskij AO
9 Putorana Plateau 2010 Krasnojarskij Kraj
10 Lena Pillars 2012 Respublika Sacha 
(Jakutija)
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coincidental: protection in the zapovedniki is to 
be obeyed as strictly as biblical commandments 
and nature in the zapovedniki is placed beyond 
human interference (Weiner 1988). As such, 
zapovedniki became veritable sancta of nature 
with a complete ban on visitation and economic 
exploitation.
The centralised communist state with complete 
state ownership of land and the power of admin-
istrative fiat provided favourable conditions for 
enforcing a strict protection regime. The remote-
ness of most reserves facilitated the implemen-
tation of this ban. It remained the prerogative 
of scientists to enter zapovedniki for ecologi-
cal monitoring. As indicators of nature (ėtalony 
prirody) and models of unspoilt wilderness, 
zapovedniki started to supply and continue to 
supply until today unparalleled time series data 
across a broad spectrum of ecological variables. 
For scientists, zapovedniki were what Wei-
ner (1999) calls an “archipelago of freedom”. 
Tucked away in the remote corners of the coun-
try, they provided a refuge from the repressions 
of the Stalinist era. Under the guise of scientific 
progress, scientists even pushed boldly for set-
ting aside further tracts of land and managed to 
expand the zapovednik system in Russia to a to-
tal of more than 10 m ha until the early 1950s.
Yet, the sacred status of zapovedniki did not 
last for long. As Stalin stepped up his efforts of 
industrialisation, the exploitation of nature fol-
lowed suit. Emblematic is the Great Plan for 
the Transformation of Nature, decreed in 1948, 
which envisioned massive agricultural and land 
improvement projects such as irrigation works. 
As a consequence, the role of the zapovedniki 
and the scientific research in them underwent 
a revaluation. Now considered a hamstring to 
the appropriation of nature, in particular the 
expansion of forestry, the number and size of 
the zapovedniki was axed in an act from 1951 
( Postanovlenie 3192 Soveta Ministrov). It re-
duced the total area of zapovedniki in the Soviet 
Union to one-tenth and closed 88 out of 128 of 
them, dropping from an area of 12.6 to a mere 1.4 
m ha (larin et al. 2003, 17). Ecological research 
and monitoring were increasingly meant to serve 
the purposes of industrialisation and reserves be-
came an “area in which scientists would learn to 
master and transform nature to serve the needs 
of the economy” (neWell 2004, 35).
Perhaps the most grotesque example of the en-
meshment of industrialisation and conservation 
can be found in the Eastern Urals Zapovednik, 
which was designated after the Kyshtym disaster 
in 1957, the third largest nuclear incident after 
Chernobyl and Fukushima. It continues to oper-
ate today under the auspices of the Russian Nu-
clear Authority (Rosatom), to measure the impact 
of radioactive fall-out on the surrounding envi-
ronment. Although Stalin’s death led to a reversal 
of a large number of the policies he had initiated, 
the gradual re-establishment of the zapovedniki 
was an arduous task whose accomplishment was 
due, in large part, to the tenacity and dedication 
of Soviet scientists (Weiner 1999). It was only 
in 1985 that the size of the area under protection 
again reached the level of 1951.
Liberalism: Expansion in the 1990s
The perestroika under Gorbačëv foreshadowed 
some of the developments that became char-
acteristic of the 1990s after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union: a renewed emphasis on envi-
ronmental protection and nature conservation, 
which shifted the balance back from exploitation 
to protection. From the mid-1980s, plans were 
voiced to establish a unified state authority in 
charge of nature protection. This culminated in 
the formation of the State Committee for Nature 
Protection (Goskomprirody) in 1988, which also 
took charge of the zapovedniki. The same year 
saw the foundation of what was to become Rus-
sia’s strongest and most influential environmen-
tal NGO, the Socio-Ecological Union, which 
turned into the nexus and voice of citizens’ envi-
ronmental concerns.
When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, two 
favourable factors created a window of oppor-
tunity for conservationists. One was the politi-
cal vacuum and fragile state power of the 1990s, 
which allowed domestic and international NGOs 
as well as international governmental organisa-
tions to step in and environmental concerns to 
gain considerable momentum. Large interna-
tional NGOs opened offices in Russia in the 
1990s, including Greenpeace (1992), the World-
wide Fund for Nature (WWF) (1994) and the 
Green Cross (1994), and started to channel fund-
ing into conservation projects as well as raise in-
ternational awareness for environmental issues 
in Russia. Helping the conservation impetus, 
the successor of the State Committee for Nature 
Protection (Goskomėkologija) received consid-
erable autonomy in decision-making with regard 
to environmental issues.
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The other favourable factor was the economic 
collapse, which reduced ambitions for devel-
opment activities on wild lands and made them 
available for conservation. A presidential decree 
from 1992 (Ukaz 1155) made the designation of 
new protected areas a priority task of govern-
mental environmental policy and set the goal 
to allot 3 % of Russia’s terrestrial area to za-
povedniki and national parks. That meant more 
than doubling the existing area under strict pro-
tection. In the absence of funds from the state 
budget, the government sought to attract funding 
from abroad. The Global Environment Facility 
(GEF), for example, has awarded more than 300 
m US $ in project funding to Russia since 1991, 
leveraging in excess of 2 bn US $ through co-
financing (GEF 2012). Bilateral donors such as 
the United States through USAID or Germany 
through its Federal Agency for Nature Con-
servation (BfN) and Kreditanstalt für Wieder-
aufbau (KfW) have also provided funds, in par-
ticular during the transition period of the 1990s. 
In some instances where the Russian state could 
not be moved to establish a protection regime 
for a particular territory, private long-term leases 
of land were arranged. This was the case for 
the Murav’ёvka Park, which was established 
through a private gift of 50 000 US $ from a 
Japanese manufacturer, channeled through the 
Socio-Ecological Union and invested into a 
50-year lease of 5 206 ha of land in the Russian 
Far East (Herrold-Menzies 2012). However, 
this trend towards private reserves did not catch 
on to a larger extent.
In short, the lack of funds as well as the weak-
ness of the Russian state in the 1990s attracted 
a plethora of actors as well as financing from 
different sources that sought to expand the pro-
tected area network. In particular, private funds 
flowed into conservation, supplementing or in-
deed taking over to a large degree from the state-
financed model. Yet, what distinguished it from 
the trend towards neoliberal conservation we are 
seeing today was the absence of monetary valu-
ation and of expected monetary pay-offs. Nature 
was not regarded as a capital to be auctioned off, 
traded and exchanged or to reap returns on, but 
rather as something worth protecting in its own 
right.
What resulted from this window of opportunity 
in the 1990s was a veritable rallye of designa-
tions of new protected areas. From the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in December 1991 until 
1999, 25 new zapovedniki and 18 new national 
parks were designated, increasing the total area 
thus protected from 26 to 41 m ha – about 2.4 % 
of Russia’s terrestrial area (see Fig. 2). In 1995, 
a new Law on Protected Areas provided the legal 
foundations for territorial conservation in Russia 
(cf. ostergren 2001). It defined a Russian um-
brella term for protected areas – Osobo Ochran-
jaemye Prirodnye Territorii (OOPT) – and dif-
ferent categories that follow loosely the IUCN 
classification (see Tab. 2). At the federal level, 
there are three major types of reserves.
1) Zapovedniki as the flagship of Russian ter-
ritorial conservation with the highest protec-
tion status and minimal intervention (similar 
to IUCN category I). Zapovedniki are de-
signated on the basis of natural conservation 
criteria and reserved for ecological research 
and monitoring.
2) National Parks, serving protection, research, 
education and tourism through differential 
zoning (similar to IUCN category II). Na-
tional parks can protect areas of significant 
natural as well as historic and cultural value.
3) Zakazniki as areas with restricted land use for 
the protection of landscapes or special bio-
logical, paleontological, hydrological or geo-
logical features (similar to IUCN category IV 
and VI). Since their protection status is less 
strict, zakazniki are typically not considered 
on a par with zapovedniki and national parks 
when it comes to conservation.
The liberal spirit of the Law on Protected  Areas 
manifested itself in two major changes in the 
protection regime. First, the law accorded pro-
tected areas wide-ranging operational auto-
nomies in the achievement of their tasks and 
curtailed the possibilities of federal tutelage 
from Moscow. This move provided the reserves 
with new freedoms, among others also to levy 
fines and develop new revenue streams, such 
as nature-based tourism, and to collect the pro-
ceeds from them. It corresponded to the politi-
cal economy of the transition reforms with their 
emphasis on decentralisation and deregulation, 
but also reflected the economic exigencies of the 
time, where federal alimentation of protected 
areas was all but absent and alternative revenue 
sources had to be tapped.
Second, the law also aimed to embed protected 
areas more into society through mandating envi-
ronmental education, tourism and public partici-
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pation as crucial pillars. The idea behind this was 
to generate public awareness of nature conser-
vation and increase the legitimacy of protected 
areas in local communities. This grew from the 
realisation that all too often protected areas had 
pursued fortress conservation approaches which 
had estranged local communities and led to pro-
tracted conflicts (Müller 2008, 427 f.), thus 
rather hamstringing than buttressing the cause 
of conservation. But the assumption was also 
that reaching out to the general public would 
ensure continued political and fiscal support for 
protected areas, as demonstrated in the United 
States, for example (ostergren 2001). As a 
consequence of this opening up, new stakehold-
ers – NGO, local residents, visitors – had to be 
incorporated into the management of protected 
areas, displacing some of the traditional author-
ity of scientists (ostergren/Jacques 2002).
What compromised the unprecedented expan-
sion and the new freedoms, was the economic 
hardship of Russia in the 1990s. While the num-
ber of protected areas multiplied, there were 
few funds for their operation. If salaries arrived 
at all, they arrived late. Often, protected areas 
management lacked the most basic supplies such 
as fuel for patrol vehicles and had to start sub-
sistence agriculture for survival (sittler et al. 
2000). This situation led to an exodus of quali-
fied personnel as well as a much-reduced capaci-
ty to enforce the protection regime vis-à-vis vio-
lations. In forest biomes, some reserves resorted 
to logging to create revenue that would keep the 
operations running. Newly established reserves 
often remained ‘paper reserves for several years, 
lacking even the most rudimentary basics such 
as an official staff or director’ (ostergren 2001, 
148). At the same time, economic hardship and 
weak law enforcement meant that poaching and 
illegal logging became more and more common. 
In particular in the Far East, large consignments 
of round timber flowed from protected areas 
close to the border with China to supply Chinese 
furniture and flooring manufacturers. While pro-
tected areas had gained weight on paper, much 
remained to be done to turn them into effective 
organisations in practice.
Tab 2: Characteristics of the most important types of protected areas in Russia
Russian nomenclature Zapovednik Nacional’nyj Park Pamjatnik Prirody Zakaznik Prirodnyj Park
International 
 nomenclature
Strict Nature 
 Reserve /  
Wilderness Area
National  
Park
Natural  
Monument
Habitat /  
Species Manage-
ment Area
Protected 
 Land scape
IUCN category Ia / Ib II III IV or VI V
Objectives (in Russia / according to IUCN)
Conservation + / + o / + o / o o / o o / o
Research + / + o / o − / o o / o o / o
Education + / − + / o o / o o / o o / o
Tourism o / − + / + o / + o / o + / +
Sustainable land use − / − o / o − / − o / + − / o
Administrative level Federation Federation Subjects
Federation and 
subjects
Subjects
Number 103 44 ca. 7 500 70 and ca. 3 000 ca. 50
Staff (per area) 40 to 80 120 - - -
Total area (million ha) 33.8 11.4 ca. 3.2 12.7 and ca. 157.5 n/a
Average area (1000 ha) 340 ca. 180 max. 0.5 ca. 57 n/a
Proportion of total  
land area
1.6 % 0.7 % 0.2 % 0.7 % and ca. 9.3 % n/a
Number of  
biosphere reserves
34 5 0 0 0
+ = Primary objective   o = Secondary objective   − = No objective 
Current as of December 2013 
Sources: Russian Ministry of Natural Resources; www.oopt.info; larin et al. 2003
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Antagonism: de-ecologisation and 
devel opment pressure in the 2000s
Vladimir Putin’s inauguration, however, ush-
ered in a new turn in the political ecology of pro-
tected areas. Whereas in the 1990s nature pro-
tection was poor but had considerable political 
clout, in the 2000s the political weight shifted to 
resource exploitation as economic growth began 
to pick up and state-building proceeded apace. 
Russian protectionists speak of a period of “de-
ecologisation” (deėkologizacija) (larin et al. 
2003, 9). International donors and development 
organisations withdrew, as Russia turned from 
a net aid recipient into a net donor. The most 
incisive change happened in the spring of 2000, 
when Putin dissolved Goskomėkologija and 
merged it into the pro-development Ministry 
of Natural Resources. This move severely cur-
tailed the administrative weight of environmen-
tal protection: Goskomėkologija’s competencies 
were cut and staff were redistributed within 
the ministry. While zapovedniki and national 
parks were united under one roof for the first 
time, the agency in charge, Rosprirodnadzor, is 
understaffed and has limited decision-making 
power. For protected areas, decision-making is 
still fragmented. National parks in particular 
contain swathes of land with commercial agri-
culture and forestry or have settlements on their 
territories, so that other ministries continue to 
be involved in decision-making and protection 
goals are compromised.
This administrative degradation of environ-
mental protection was reflected in the slash-
ing of the goals for designating new protected 
areas as well as in the decline or complete halt 
of actual designations. While an order from 
1994 (Rasporjaženie Pravitel’stva RF, 23 April 
1994, No. 572-r) had mandated the creation of 
72 new zapovedniki and 42 new national parks 
until 2005, an order from 2001 (Rasporjaženie 
Pravitel’stva RF, 23 May 2001, No. 725-r) in-
stated much less ambitious goals: now, 9 za-
povedniki and 12 national parks were to be cre-
ated until 2010, i. e. 21 reserves instead of the 
original 91. In both cases, de facto designations 
fell far short of the self-imposed goals (see Fig. 
2). In the 1990s financial limitations had not al-
lowed to create more protected areas and in 1999 
the Ministry of Finance had even vetoed new re-
serves due to a lack of funds. Since 2000, how-
ever, it was the Ministry of Natural Resources 
itself which held back the creation of new re-
serves through imposing additional bureaucratic 
obstacles and delaying procedures (stepanickiJ 
2004). Nature protection was thus faced with the 
paradoxical situation that the authority in charge 
of it at the same time tried to obstruct it wherever 
possible. As a result, there were no new designa-
tions of reserves from 2001 to 2005 and only one 
new zapovednik was established in the period 
from 2001 to 2010.
In general, economic development started to 
take precedence over conservation from the 
2000s. Increasingly, state authorities began to 
see environmental protection as an obstacle to 
achieving economic growth. One indicator of 
this is the shift from zapovedniki to national 
parks in the designation of new protected areas 
since the beginning of the 2000s (see Fig. 2). Na-
tional parks allow more options for development 
of activities besides conservation and the Minis-
try of Economic Development viewed them with 
less suspicion of obstructing economic growth 
than zapovedniki (stepanickiJ 2004). In the in-
tended designations of new protected areas from 
2011 to 2020 (Rasporjaženie Pravitel’stva RF, 
22 December 2011, No. 2322-r), national parks 
outnumber zapovedniki two to one. The formal 
classification, however, often does not corre-
spond to the conservation properties and de facto 
management of reserves. A recent study found, 
for example, that a large number of Russian na-
tional parks are more appropriate to IUCN cat-
egory I, i. e. zapovedniki (krever et al. 2009, 
38 ff.). Several reserves are thus operating under 
a less strict protection regime than would be ad-
equate.
With economic growth taking off, development 
projects and conservation came to be at logger-
heads more often. Mining, oil and gas explora-
tion, commercial logging and tourism develop-
ment have encroached on different protected ar-
eas. Among the most critical projects are several 
that threaten UNESCO World Heritage Sites. 
Accommodating gold mining activities in parts 
of the Jugyd-Va National Park (No. 28 in Fig. 
1) in the Virgin Komi Forests, local authorities 
have attempted to extract the affected areas from 
the national park. In the Golden Mountains of 
Altai World Heritage Site, Gazprom has been 
planning to construct a pipeline across the Ukok 
plateau for exporting gas to China. Although 
plans were shelved in May 2013 in favour of an 
alternative route in the Far East, once again eco-
nomic concerns related to Chinese demands and 
not ecological ones were the major drivers for 
this decision (Forbes 2012).
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While reserves have come under growing de-
velopment pressure in the 2000s, what also 
increased was the budget lines. With the incor-
poration into the Ministry of Natural Resources 
in 2000, the budget available for environmental 
protection more than doubled and it has since 
been growing more or less in pace with the fed-
eral budget (Müller 2008). These increases 
have resulted in a paradoxical situation where 
protected areas have enjoyed an increase in 
funding with a concomitant decrease in political 
weight. It bears mentioning, however, that these 
budget increases added to a low base level, after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union had shrunk bud-
gets of protected areas by as much as 90 % in the 
1990s (Wells/WilliaMs 1998, 200). Even now, 
an inspector in an average zapovednik earns no 
more than RUB 4 000 (about 100 €) per month 
(Greenpeace 2011). As a result, reserves are of-
ten unable to attract and retain qualified staff, but 
have to hire untrained personnel and invest ex-
tensively in their qualification. Having received 
this training, it is not uncommon, however, that 
people quit and apply for better paid jobs with 
their newly acquired skills (fiorino/ostergren 
2012).
In 2009, the latest year for which data are avail-
able to the author, the total budget for the Rus-
sian zapovedniki and national parks was 2.7 bn 
roubles, about 62 m €, for a total area of about 
43 m ha (see Fig. 2). For comparison, this is 
about six times the budget of Bavarian For-
est National Park in Germany with an area of 
0.024 m ha. While the lion’s share of financing 
still comes from the federal budget, the second 
largest source of income are revenue-generating 
activities. In most cases, these are created either 
through timber harvesting or through tourism 
activities such as offering guided tours, accom-
modation or charging admission fees for parts 
of a reserve. The operating budget shows high 
variance between protected areas. In 2009, Ti-
girekskij Zapovednik (No. 100 in Fig. 1), for ex-
ample, had to make do with RUB 6.5 m (about 
150 000 €) per year and its only additional in-
come outside the federal budget was a small 
amount from foreign grants (6 500 €). Despite 
these financial restrictions, it has been able to de-
velop a wide range of activities beyond environ-
mental conservation, ranging from outreach and 
education to nature-based tourism in cooperation 
with local communities and cultural events such 
as a museum night. Sochi National Park (No. 2 
in Fig. 1), by contrast, had an annual operating 
budget of 303 m roubles (about 7 m €) and raked 
in more than half of it (179 m roubles) through 
revenue-generating activities. Almost half of the 
park’s territory is designated as a recreational 
zone, and its proximity to the tourist hotspot of 
Sochi has allowed it to develop a wide range of 
activities for visitors.
Fig. 2: Development of the number and total area of federal protected areas in Russia
Sources: 
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The political ecology of the 2000s thus experi-
enced a shift in priorities away from increasing 
the area under protection to pursuing develop-
ment activities which were often at odds with 
protection goals. Protected areas saw themselves 
increasingly faced with having to fend off at-
tempts at using their territories. While the fund-
ing experienced significant augmentation, the 
designation of new protected areas was delayed 
and previous goals for new designations were re-
vised downwards. Protected areas were forced to 
conclude compromises, as the pressure on them 
to open up to development was ratcheted up.
Neoliberalism: economisation in the 
2010s
The stand-off between protection and develop-
ment, characteristic for the 2000s, took a new 
turn in the 2010s. Whereas earlier protected ar-
eas would be perceived as an obstacle to be re-
duced or avoided, a gradual change of thinking 
started to see them more and more as an asset to 
create a potential return on investment. The 2011 
order of the Russian government (Rasporjaženie 
Pravitel’stva RF, 22 December 2011, No. 2322-r) 
reflects this new take on protected areas. It man-
dates to pursue tourism development through 
building new infrastructure and establishing a 
unified brand of Russian protected areas. For 
that purpose, reserves are expected to attract in-
vestors and cooperate with international travel 
agencies. In order to kick start this economic 
valorisation, the Russian government provided 
seed funding of 2.4 bn roubles (ca 55 m €) for 
the period from 2011 to 2013, which represents a 
top-up of about one-quarter of the annual budget 
for protected areas for that period. The basic idea 
is to leverage this seed financing to capitalise on 
the rapid increase in tourist flows. The Ministry 
of Natural Resources reported a jump in esti-
mated visitor numbers from 0.89 m in 2004 to 
1.6 m in 2006 and 6.5 m in 2010 and aims to 
attract 13 m visitors by 2013 (Moscow Times 
2012, Müller et al. 2011). In a move towards 
the commodification of protected areas, the min-
istry decided to start levying admission fees for 
protected areas from 2014 onwards. If each of 
the 13 m prospective visitors paid but 170 rou-
bles (ca. 4 €) in entrance fees, this would equal 
the federal budget for protected areas. Currently, 
Pribaikal’skij National Park (Nr. 7) is one of the 
few reserves to charge admissions fees, in this 
case at a rate of 60 roubles (ca. 1.50 €) per adult 
per day.
The general idea of developing responsible 
nature-based tourism points to the willingness 
to enhance the economic use value of parks. 
Experience has shown that it can both create 
substantial revenue streams for local communi-
ties (Mayer et al. 2010) and enhance visitors’ 
awareness of ecological issues, if well managed 
(eagles et al. 2002). Both of these fields need 
more attention in Russia. The local population 
has commonly perceived reserves as a nuisance, 
constraining rather than assisting them in their 
livelihoods. Rigorously enforced hunting, fish-
ing, mushroom picking and visitation bans have 
done more to estrange the local population than 
to secure its support. The creation of new income 
sources through tourism provides the opportuni-
ty to increase local acceptance of reserves. This 
would help reduce conflicts and instances of lo-
cal corruption as well as bolster law enforcement 
in the reserves if local authorities stand behind 
it. Ecological education and awareness, too, are 
in dire straits in Russia: Nature-based tourism in 
Russia, the great majority of which is domestic, 
often is a high-impact activity, where hunting, 
fishing and consuming play a major role, and 
littering is common (iakovleva et al. 2012). A 
concerted approach could create a model of sus-
tainable tourism in reserves with potential edu-
cational effects on visitors that could lead to a 
behavioural change.
In its push to develop reserves, Russia has the 
United States in mind. In a 2010 cabinet meet-
ing, Putin cited the US National Park Service 
(NPS) as a model: “Yellowstone National Park is 
visited by 2 million tourists [annually], while we 
in Kamchatka have only a few thousand people 
visiting per year” (Moscow Times 2012). A 2012 
strategy paper of the Ministry of Natural Re-
sources compares the figure of an alleged 14 200 
m US $ of tourist revenues in the United States to 
a mere 11.7 m US $ in Russia to justify the push 
for increased development (Rossijskaja Gazeta 
2012). The explicit assumption is that protected 
areas can be turned into profitable ventures and 
cover their own costs in the future. This expecta-
tion ignores, however, that while the NPS created 
337 m US $ in revenues in 2012, it also had 2 900 
m US $ in costs (National Park Service 2012)! 
Even in the United States, then, conservation 
continues to be an endeavour that requires sig-
nificant public subsidies. In Russia, only a few 
reserves have the chance to become self-sustain-
ing. These are either close to tourist centres and 
boast easy infrastructural access, such as Sochi 
National Park, or feature spectacular landscapes 
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and mega-fauna, such as Kronockij Zapovednik 
in Kamčatka (No. 17) that Putin was referring to.
The current approach to valorising reserves in 
Russia, however, privileges revenue generation 
over ecological concerns in manifold ways. For 
one thing, most of the tourism development is 
scheduled to take place in the zapovedniki, 
which, as IUCN category I reserves, are not in-
tended for tourism. Ten zapovedniki but only two 
national parks have been put forward to take part 
in a pioneer project for tourism development. Up 
to now, zapovedniki have been spared mass tour-
ism development, but this might change with the 
clear disregard of areas’ protection status in the 
rollout of this policy. Moreover, the government 
has threatened to freeze the financing for re-
serves that do not sign up for this policy. Several 
truculent reserve directors have been replaced 
with managers who are more eager to implement 
the government’s plans (Moscow Times 2012). 
At stake here is what robbins (2012, 176 ff.) 
has termed an issue of conservation and control: 
control is wrested from reserves and from local 
residents alike and conservation policies are im-
posed from the central state down. This applies 
a forteriori to the situation in Russia, with its 
dominance of vertical power relationships and 
the recentralisation since the 2000s, where local 
concerns are even less of consideration than in 
most other countries. As tourism development 
is forced onto protected areas, criteria for what 
constitutes successful management are chang-
ing. Entrepreneurialism and creating revenue 
are becoming more important than biodiversity 
conservation or local livelihoods.
Because revenues from tourism enter the budget 
of the individual reserves directly and not that of 
the ministry, there is an immediate incentive to 
maximise revenue-generating activities – often 
to the detriment of nature. Although it would of-
ten be wiser to concentrate accommodation and 
leisure offerings outside the reserves so as to mi-
nimise the ecological impact, for example, this 
would also mean that the revenues would flow 
into the coffers of the municipalities and not of 
the reserve. Reserves are thus in direct compe-
tition with municipalities, which is intensified 
through the current skewed reward structure in 
favour of development. Selling permits for re-
creational activities such as rafting, hunting or 
fishing or for the use of motorised vehicles (4 × 4, 
snow mobiles, …) is another potential source of 
income, but again leads to an increase of unde-
sirable forms of tourism. Given the absence of 
standards and regulations regarding eco-tourism 
as well as the lack of competencies and skills 
(iakovleva et al. 2012), developing sustainable 
eco-tourism seems to be a distant mirage for now.
For another, the balance between protection and 
use has clearly tipped towards the latter’s side, 
when in November 2011 the Russian parlia-
ment passed amendments to the 1995 Law on 
Protected Areas, which facilitated the construc-
tion of sports facilities in protected areas. This 
decision presented the gravest pro-development 
legislation for protected areas in a long time. 
The occasion for this revision were multiple 
plans to construct ski resorts and recreation fa-
cilities in the Caucasus Mountains and along the 
Black Sea Coast, affecting protected areas such 
as the Caucasus Zapovednik (No. 5), the Utriš 
Zapovednik (No. 103) and Sochi National Park 
(No. 2). Among them, the 2014 Winter Olym-
pics in Sochi on the Russian Black Sea coast 
were the highest profile venture, along with a 
string of seven further resorts in the North Cau-
casus. The developer OAO Northern Caucasus 
Resorts is pursuing this project, which envisions 
building 1 100 km of ski runs and 140 000 hotel 
beds for an expected 10 m annual visitors and 
at a price tag of 450 bn roubles (about 10 bn €) 
(JoHnson 2012). The amendments constituted 
a compromise between developers and protec-
tionists in face of the threat to downsize Sochi 
National Park to allow for construction of win-
ter sports facilities (Müller 2014). While such 
downsizing would have given over the excluded 
territory to privatisation, and thus up for grabs 
for both developers and state officials, under the 
new legislation the areas remain under the ju-
risdiction and ownership of the protected areas. 
Developers and protected areas have to agree 
on a long-term lease and the operation of the fa-
cilities must conform with ecological principles. 
This compromise enshrined the principle of the 
non-violability of reserve boundaries, while at 
the same time ceding ground to development 
interests.
Paired with lax regulation and oversight as well 
as a weak rule of law, as is the case in Russia, 
the race for development also creates ample op-
portunities for administrative rent-seeking. The 
relaxation of conservationist regulation afforded 
through the 2011 order must also be understood 
in this context: It provides a source of resource 
appropriation for state officials through turn-
ing protected lands into commodities. Because 
construction permits in reserves are coveted due 
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to the privileged location, federal civil servants 
and reserve managers are able to extract kick-
backs for allocating these permits, for example 
(Müller et al. 2011). These opportunities to 
reap private gain are at odds with ecologically 
responsible development, since the highest kick-
backs can be obtained for the least sustainable 
activities.
Granting concessions for reserve development 
to a small number of developers would be able 
to ameliorate some of these concerns. These de-
velopers would be responsible for running food, 
lodging or retail operations and could be moni-
tored more easily and made to adhere to a basic 
set of sustainability and pricing principles. This 
is a model pursued in some major US nation-
al parks, where the company Xanterra has the 
concession to operate campsites, hotels and gift 
shops. Although the new development regime 
in Russia explicitly suggests such a privatised 
model, there have been no bids from interested 
investors so far. The remoteness of many re-
serves as well as the lack of basic transport infra-
structure are formidable obstacles. The majority 
of reserves are several hours by plane and a sub-
sequent lengthy overland drive from the closest 
international airport. Many of them cannot be 
accessed through road travel in regular vehicles 
or are off-limits during certain times of the year 
due to weather conditions.
The low level of service quality in the tourism 
sector and the lack of a stable rule of law, which 
is critical for investment decisions, do not help 
either. A report from the World Economic Fo-
rum placed Russia on rank 138 out of 140 as 
one of the least welcoming tourist destinations 
in the world (blanke/cHiesa 2013). These fac-
tors keep entrepreneurs from investing into tour-
ism infrastructure, because of the uncertainty 
involved. What continues to predominate is 
thus a piecemeal approach, in which reserves 
can launch their own tourism initiatives whose 
extent and compatibility with nature protection 
are a function of the directors’ entrepreneurial-
ism and moral integrity, the accessibility of the 
territory, the attractiveness of the natural endow-
ment and the willingness to cooperate with local 
municipalities.
Conclusion
Political and economic processes have had tre-
mendous impacts on protected areas in Russia, 
both in the Soviet and in the post-Soviet period. 
In this sense, reserves in Russia are not only, as 
they have always been, indicators of nature, but 
also indicators of the dominant political and eco-
nomic regime. Any analysis of the governance 
and management of reserves must thus be sensi-
tive to the links between the two. Since the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 one was able 
to observe a shift from a liberal political ecology 
in the 1990s to an antagonistic one in the 2000s 
and a neoliberal one taking hold since about 
2010 (see Tab. 3 for a summary). During the 
liberal period, new protected areas mushroomed 
and new stakeholders appeared on the stage, as 
reserves opened up to the outside. As the Rus-
sian economy picked up in the 2000s, economic 
interests increasingly started to get into conflict 
with territorial protection. The de signation of 
new areas came to a grinding halt and exist-
ing areas had to defend themselves against at-
tempts at resource exploitation. The neoliberal 
period, then, no longer saw reserves as a barrier 
to growth but rather as potential assets to create a 
return on investment. The valorisation and com-
modification of areas’ natural endowment start-
ed to occupy the top of the agenda, with new ini-
tiatives to boost tourism and raise entrance fees.
Yet, the neoliberal conservation logic – becom-
ing more dominant worldwide – has taken hold 
in Russia with an important, almost perverse 
twist. While this shift has the potential to gen-
erate additional revenues for cash-strapped re-
serves and widen the possibilities for environ-
mental outreach, it also carries a distinct risk of 
overdevelopment and overexploitation. All too 
often, the gradual commodification of nature in 
protected areas is not happening in the interest 
of conservation, but for the sake of creating a 
return on investment. Reserves are exhorted to 
turn a profit and develop entrepreneurial think-
ing to squeeze more revenues out of their ter-
ritories. Neoliberal conservation is thus heading 
off in the wrong direction in Russia: economic 
incentives are not aligned with goals of nature 
conservation, as it should be. Rather, nature con-
servation must be adapted to the exigencies and 
demands of the markets. This new imperative 
creates uneven spatial impacts: reserves that are 
close to tourist hotspots, easily accessible, boast 
attractive landscapes or charismatic mega-fauna, 
have an entrepreneurial director and are willing 
to permit more recreational activities on their 
territories will thrive. Others that are remoter, 
have stricter protection policies or lack in natu-
ral attractiveness are likely to suffer. New desig-
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nations, too, increasingly have to submit to this 
logic, as is evident in the preference for national 
parks over strict nature reserves.
In blunt terms, Russian protected areas are urged 
more and more to transform themselves from 
sacred cows into cash cows. There is no doubt 
that the funding situation has improved over the 
past 20 years and that nature-based tourism of-
fers new chances to disseminate the message 
of nature protection with a growing part of the 
Russian population. Evidence suggests, how-
ever, that in the trade-off between exploitation 
and conservation, the cards are stacked against 
Tab. 3: The changing political-ecological regimes in Russia since the end of the 1980s
Regime Characteristics Administrative Acts Actor Groups
Liberalism
(late 1980s  
– 1990s)
– ‘Conservation bonanza’: 
designation of 25 new 
 zapovedniki (IUCN cate-
gory I) and 18 new national 
parks (IUCN category II)
– Weakness of Russian state
– International and private 
funding during budget cri-
sis after the Soviet collapse
– Expansion of mission of 
protected areas to in clude 
tourism, public participa-
tion and environmental 
education
– International environmen-
tal NGOs (ENGOs) open 
offices in Russia
– 1988: Formation 
of State Commit-
tee for Nature Pro-
tection (Goskom-
prirody)
– 1992: Order 1155: 
Nature conserva-
tion is made a 
 priority task and 
3 % of Russia’s 
terrestrial area are 
mandated to be set 
aside under strict 
protection
– 1995: Law on Pro-
tected Areas
– Authorities: weak; priority on expan-
ding protected area network
– International ENGOs: lobbying for 
designation of new reserves and pro-
viding funds and expertise
– National ENGOs: important driving 
force for political change and mouth-
piece for societal discontent
– Visitors: visitor numbers are low; 
unregulated visitation
– Local population: often antagonistic; 
use of resources for livelihoods
– Reserve management: assigned new 
tasks but underfunded; often unable 
to provide for basic operation of re-
serves; establishment of international 
links
Antagonism
(2000s)
– Reduced administrative 
weight of nature protection
– No new designations bet-
ween 2001 and 2005
– Shift of priorities in desig-
nations from zapovedniki 
to national parks
– Protected areas clash with 
exploitation of natural 
 resources as economic 
growth picks up
– Budget increases
– 2000: Dissolution 
of Goskomėko-
logija
– Integration of na-
ture conservation 
into Ministry of 
Natural Resources
– 2001: Order 725: 
reduction of goals 
for new designa-
tions of protected 
areas
– Authorities: resistance to nature pro-
tection; focus on resource exploitation
– International ENGOs: reduction of 
activities
– National ENGOs: consolidation; 
 taking over from international ENGOs
– Visitors: increasing numbers of 
 domestic and international visitors
– Local population: increase of partici-
pation in reserve management; dis-
satisfaction with restrictions
– Reserve management: better fund ing 
and equipment
Neoliberalism
(2010s)
– Commodification of pro-
tected areas through brand-
ing and tourism initiatives
– Increased privileging of 
 revenue generation of 
 nature protection
– Entrepreneurialism of 
 protected areas becomes 
important
– Uneven geographical im-
pact reflecting accessibility 
and attractive ness of re-
serves
– Admission fees planned 
from 2014
– 2011: Order 2322: 
emphasis on tou-
rism and infra-
structure develop-
ment; con struction 
of recrea tional fa-
cilities in protect-
ed areas allow ed
– Authorities: focus on creating return-
on-investment
– International ENGOs: reduced level 
of significance
– National ENGOs: providing a critical 
voice
– Visitors: conflict between typical 
high-impact activities and goals of 
nature protection
– Local population: dissatisfaction 
with restrictions, but slowly grow ing 
benefits from tourism
– Reserve management: growing con-
flict between development and pro-
tection; pressure from central 
government
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the latter. The current political-economic regime 
means a change in what is valued in nature pro-
tection, favouring monetary value creation over 
conservation. While this may create financial 
pay-offs in the short run, in the long run it might 
endanger the very foundations on which this ex-
ploitation is built. Yet, what use is a cash cow if 
it gives no milk?
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